System failure minimisation using automated design optimisation by D. Astapenko (7119971) & Lisa Jackson (1250010)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
System Failure Minimisation Using Automated Design Optimisation  
 
Dovile Astapenko and Lisa M. Bartlett 
Aeronautical and Automotive Engineering , Loughborough University, 
Loughborough, UK 
 
Abstract 
 
Safety systems are designed to prevent the occurrence and future 
development of hazardous situations. Consequences of the failure of a 
safety system varies from minor inconvenience and cost to personal 
injury, significant economic loss and death. The operation of a safety 
system can be improved by either introducing better performing 
components or by increasing the number of redundant components. At the 
same time, such design alterations can influence how available resources 
are utilized. The focus of this paper is to introduce a generic optimisation 
method for constructing an optimal design case for any safety system, 
with the aim of maximising its likelihood of functioning on demand and at 
the same time ensuring optimal usage of available resources. The 
analysed optimisation problem is represented as the constrained single 
objective problem. The implemented optimisation method employs Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) to represent system failure causes and Binary 
Decision Diagrams (BDDs) to quantify its failure probability. A Single 
Objective Genetic Algorithm (SOGA) has been chosen as the optimisation 
technique. The methodology is illustrated with the optimisation of a High 
Integrity Protection System (HIPS) design. The constraints imposed are 
on system dormant failure probability, cost and maintenance down time. 
Results of the application, with the generic implications of the analysis, are 
discussed. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Safety systems are designed to prevent the occurrence of certain 
conditions and their future development into a hazardous situation. 
Consequences of the failure of a safety system varies from minor 
inconvenience and cost to personal injury, significant economic loss and 
death. Safety systems have a specific functioning principle, i.e. such 
systems work on demand. A high likelihood of functioning on demand for a 
safety system can be ensured by altering its design. In such case 
redundancy techniques can be introduced or certain components maybe 
replaced with that of better reliability characteristics [1]. However design 
alterations and therefore level of system reliability improvement is usually 
subject to a number of design requirements such as cost, weight [2] or 
maintenance downtime and other requirements of the system 
performance. Thus the problem is to construct such system design that 
would improve system reliability within constraints imposed on certain 
design characteristics. However in many cases to achieve this by 
manually enumerating all possible design options and analysing system 
performance is impossible. 
 
In this paper the general system design optimisation algorithm (GSDOA) 
to determine an optimal design configuration for a safety system is 
introduced. The approach combines an optimisation technique with both 
qualitative and quantitative system analysis methods. Fault tree analysis 
provides schematic description of possible combinations of system 
conditions that could lead to its failure [3]. Thus it was employed to 
represent a particular design configuration through listing system failure 
causes for this system design. A binary decision diagram (BDD) is a 
directed acyclic graph representing a Boolean Function. The quantitative 
analysis of fault trees can be performed by transformation into BDDs [4]. 
The BDD based approach is considered to be a computationally more 
efficient method. Thus in the design optimisation algorithm the BDD 
method has been implemented to quantify system failure. Genetic 
Algorithm (GA) was chosen as the optimisation technique to perform the 
optimisation part of the approach. GA is a stochastic global search method 
which is based on the mechanics of natural genetic variation and natural 
selection [5]. It is a population based technique where encoded parameter 
sets are used rather than the parameter sets themselves. GA uses the 
fitness function itself, does not require derivative or other auxiliary 
quantities and can easily handle constrained optimisation problems [6]. 
 
The approach is designed to be applicable to any safety system. In this 
paper as an application example the summary of work carried out on the 
High Integrity Protection System (HIPS) is provided. The overall aim of the 
optimisation is to achieve the HIPS system design which is optimal in 
three criteria: unavailability, cost, and maintenance down time. 
 
2. System Analysis 
 
One of the main objectives when designing any safety system is to ensure 
its high likelihood of availability on demand. Required system availability 
can be achieved be introducing certain system design structure. This 
section discusses cases when initial system design is defined and a 
number of alterations are introduced in order to improve system 
availability. Quantitative system analysis due to design changes is also 
discussed. System design alterations and analysis is a preparative part of 
the system design optimisation process. 
 
2.1 Design Considerations 
 
A number of alterations regarding the structure and operation of a safety 
system influence system availability. Design alterations that can affect 
system reliability are redundancies introduced at component or subsystem 
levels and also different component-type selections. System operation can 
be influenced by time taken to maintain the system and how often 
maintenance actions are taken. However when making alteration a 
number of system characteristics have to be taken into account, such as 
system cost, weight and etc. 
 
In order to prevent system failure caused by failure of one component 
redundancy can be incorporated into the system structure. Introducing 
redundancy system components are duplicated. As a result contribution of 
failure of one-type component towards failure of the system occurs if and 
only if all redundant components fail. It is also possible to introduce so 
called k-out-of-n redundancy. Here n defines number of redundant 
components and k is a number of working components that is needed for 
successful system operation. In this case a system will be subject to 
failure if n-k+1 ≤ n components fail. If k is equal to 1 then it is equivalent to 
a simple redundancy case. Both redundancy types can be implemented at 
component or sub-system level. Thus the problem is what redundancy 
level, i.e. number of redundant components, to choose in order to improve 
system reliability up to a certain level since available resources are usually 
very limited. 
 
It is also possible to improve system reliability by replacing a component 
with another component selected from a group of possible alternatives. 
Each possible candidate can have different characteristics such as failure 
rate, cost, weight or time taken to perform its maintenance. A problem in 
making a decision about candidate suitability appears when the choice 
between different characteristics of the components needs to be made. 
For example, a choice needs to be made between a more reliable 
component which is expensive and a less reliable component but which is 
twice as cheap as the previous one. 
 
After system design has been finalised system maintenance can also be 
considered as an option contributing towards system reliability 
improvement [7]. The time taken to maintain the system can be altered to 
meat safety requirements. When a system design is defined system 
maintenance frequency depends only on time intervals between 
preventive maintenance activities of the components. Thus time intervals 
between preventive maintenance of components can also be considered 
during system design alteration process. 
 
2.2 Analysis of System Designs 
 
A fault tree provides a schematic description of possible causes of a 
specific system failure. Each event of the fault tree defines a dynamic 
change of state of a system element. Thus if a system design is altered 
and new components are introduced resulting fault tree for a new design 
system will also include new events representing failures of the new 
system components. This justifies the use of fault tree analysis to identify 
different system designs and find system reliability for the specified 
designs. 
 
However, on the other hand, it is time-consuming to construct and then 
analyse a fault tree for each possible design case. The problem can be 
resolved by using a fault tree representing all possible design alterations. 
First this idea was suggested by Andrews & Pattison [8]. They analysed a 
specific system case which was discussed in more detail in [9]. In this 
paper the problem of constructing a fault tree comprising all possible 
designs is extended. Rules which define changes in a fault tree according 
to alterations of system design introduced are presented. Employing these 
rules it is possible to represent all possible design variations in one fault 
tree for any safety system analysed. 
 
2.2.1 Fault Tree Modification Patterns 
 
Consider different design alteration cases, for example, a replacement of 
a chosen component with a certain number of redundant components. In 
this case the number of new components can vary from 1 to n. 
Additionally the k-out-of-n redundancy can be chosen were k is not 
defined and can be equal to any number form interval (1, n). A different 
component type selection and its replacement with another chosen initial 
design component also results in a system design change. Letter t 
identifies a number of possible component types. However It is also 
possible to introduce component type selection option for new redundant 
components. Thus the choices of system design alterations associated 
with a replacement of one component can be defined with maximum 
values of three variables: n, k and t. These variables are called design 
variables since they define changes being introduced to the initial system 
design. 
 
A fault tree representing all possible design variations includes house 
events. The house events are employed to switch on or off different 
branches of the fault tree to model causes of system failure for each 
design alternative. All house events in the fault tree are linked up in 
groups. Each group is associated with either introduced redundancy or 
component type selection. Links between house events in one group are 
set to alter a part of the fault tree by switching certain branches on and off 
so that only one possible design alternative is modelled.  
 
House events together with structural fault tree changes associated with 
system design alterations are incorporated in the initial design fault tree 
using fault tree modification patterns. A fault tree modification pattern 
(FTMP) defines a fault tree structure representing all possible design 
variations after a replacement of one component. The fault tree structure 
incorporates new basic events associated with a group of together linked 
house events. Groups of house events corresponding to different FTMPs 
are independent from each other.  
 
Each modification pattern is defined by three parameters: the maximum 
possible number of redundant components (n), redundancy type (k) and 
the number of possible different component types (t). There are five FTMP 
patterns corresponding to all possible component replacement cases. 
Each replacement is possible at both component and subsystem level. A 
FTMP is identified according to values of variables n, k and t: 
 
1. Pattern 1: n > 1, k = 1, t = 1; 
2. Pattern 2: n > 1, k ≤ n ( k≠1), t = 1; 
3. Pattern 3: n > 1, k = 1, t > 1; 
4. Pattern 4: n > 1, k ≤ n ( k≠1), t > 1; 
5. Pattern 5: n = 1, k = 1, t > 1; 
 
Consider a system with a fault tree in Figure 1. As an example Pattern 1 is 
used which represents the case when one system element is replaced 
with several redundant elements. The pump is chosen to be replaced and 
up to n redundant pumps can be used. The resulting fault tree is shown in 
Figure 2 a). If a specific case is analysed and, for example, when n = 3 the 
fault tree for this system is given in Figure 2 b).Here the fault tree contains 
a group of 3 house events. A number of pumps in the system is defined by 
turning on a relevant branch, i.e. by setting a relevant house event to 
TRUE while the rest of the house events are set to FALSE. For instance, if 
the value of the house event PFT2 is set to TRUE and house events PFT1 
and PFT3 are set to FALSE then the fault tree represents as system with 
two redundant pumps fitted in. 
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Figure 1. Initial Design System Fault Tree 
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Figure 2. Altered Design System Fault Tree 
In a similar manner other modification patterns are implemented and then 
certain house events can be set to True of False to model different design 
cases. 
 
To summarise the fault tree representing all possible system designs is 
constructed from the initial design fault tree and altered according to given 
design variables using appropriate FTMPs. It means any system can be 
chosen and the design alterations specific only to that system can be 
implemented. Therefore it can be stated that implementation of FTMPs is 
the first step towards constructing a general optimisation algorithm 
applicable to any safety system. 
 
2.2.2 System Unavailability Evaluation  
 
As sated at the beginning of this section, to analyse different design cases 
one fault tree representing all potential designs can be built. However, 
when performing quantitative system analysis for different designs each 
design needs to be analysed individually. Fault tree trimming operation is 
introduced for this purpose. It is implemented in two steps. First a 
particular design case is modelled by setting house events to either TRUE 
or FALSE sate. Then the fault tree undergoes trimming operation. 
Branches with house events set to a FALSE state are cut off resulting in a 
fault tree for the analysed system design case. 
 
Although trimming may slow down the optimisation process, it allows 
greatly reducing the size of the tree being analysed which results in a 
much faster calculation. It is especially useful when a larger number of 
design variables is used and / or their maximum possible values are large 
and when alterations are made at sub-system level. 
 
At the following stage to find system unavailability for each generated 
design its fault tree is converted to BDD. Thus a BDD based method was 
chosen for quantitative analysis instead of using a fault tree approach. A 
BDD is a directed acyclic graph that represents a Boolean function. All 
paths through the BDD star at the root vertex and terminate in one of two 
states: a 1 state or a 0 sate. When applied in reliability analysis the 1 state 
corresponds to system failure, i.e. occurrence of the top event. Therefore 
paths terminating in a 1 sate form a cut set of the fault tree. Conversion of 
the fault tree to BDD format enables to find exact system unavailability in a 
computationally more efficient way. The BDD approach detailed by R. 
Remenyte-Prescott [10] was employed in the algorithm. 
 
3. System Design Optimisation Algorithm 
 
3.1 Optimisation problem introduction 
 
A system design optimisation problem is analysed as a general single 
objective minimisation problem. The problem is stated as a minimisation of 
a system failure probability: 
 
(1) ( )sysmin XQ
 
where X is m–dimensional vector X = {x1, x2, …, xn}. An element xi is a 
failure probability value of a basic event i i.e. system component i. Vector 
dimension m is equal to a number of basic events in the fault tree or 
system components subject to failure. Thus if the number of system 
components varies for different design cases contents of X is adjusted to 
the changes. It follows that the optimisation objective to minimise system 
unreliability is equivalent to the objective to find such vector X that 
corresponds to minimum system unavailability. 
 
In the developed approach it is possible to set a number of limitations to 
system characteristics. If a system design i meets the limitations it is 
considered as a feasible system design. Constraints for system cost, 
weight and volume can be used. To use the resources efficiently it may be 
useful to have minimum and maximum constraints (Eq. 2). If only 
maximum limit values are needed then the minimum constraint values 
become equal to zero. 
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Since safety system works on demand time taken to maintain the system 
influence its availability. Therefore possibility to define limits for minimum 
and/ or maximum maintenance down time is also implemented in the 
algorithm:  
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3.2 Optimisation Algorithm Structure 
 
The structure of the optimisation algorithm is shown in Figure 3. The 
algorithm contains three main stages. At first all possible system designs 
are introduced using fault tree modification patterns chosen according to a 
given list of design variables. The resulting fault tree then can used for 
quantitative system analysis. Quantitative analysis is performed to 
evaluate system unavailability for different design cases. On the other 
hand individual system designs are generated using an optimisation 
technique. Therefore these two processes are performed simultaneously. 
It means each time a set of certain design variable values is generated it 
is passed to evaluated reliability of the corresponding design. The 
obtained result is passed back to the optimisation part. The obtained 
information is then applied to generate another set of design variable 
values and the process is repeated. At the end of the optimisation process 
an optimal system design is generated which represents a system design 
with minimal failure probability. 
Three major techniques are employed. System designs are presented 
using fault trees analysis and BDD technique is employed for system 
quantitative analysis. Search for the optimal system design is performed 
using single objective Genetic Algorithm (SOGA). 
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Figure 3. Structure of GSDOA 
 
3.3 Genetic Algorithm 
 
The implemented GA is summarised by the flowchart in Figure 4. Each 
stage of the algorithm is discussed in detail. 
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3.3.1 String Encoding and Initialisation 
 
When developing a GA a problem specific representation is needed to 
describe each chromosome of the population. In the introduced approach 
a set of design variables associated with a problem forms a chromosome. 
Binary numbers are used for encoding of each variable. In each string, 
each design variable is allocated a particular number of bits required to 
code a possible maximum value of the variable. It ensures that the size of 
a chromosome is sufficient to store any value of design variables and its 
size remains constant. 
 
In the proposed algorithms a feasible initial population is generated. It is 
implemented in the following way. Each string is generated by random 
sampling. For each decision it is checked if the amount of resources 
required for the generated design system does not overcome predefined 
limits. If all constraints for resources are satisfied the string representing 
the system design enters the initial population. The process is repeated 
until N chromosomes enter the initial population. Here N denotes the size 
of the population. 
 
3.3.2 Reproduction, Crossover and Mutation 
 
Three operators are used to create a new offspring population. At first the 
reproduction operator is implemented employing a biased roulette wheel. 
As a result N/2 couples of parent strings enter into a mating pool. Strings 
of each couple are crossed over employing a one-point crossover 
operator. As a result two new strings are created. During the crossover 
process, a bit-by-bit mutation is also carried out.  
 
3.3.3 Penalisation 
 
A new offspring population is created as a result of reproduction, 
crossover and mutation. At this stage the new strings are decoded and 
their corresponding objective function values are evaluated. Since the 
algorithm is developed to solve a constrained optimisation problem a 
penalty application was chosen as an approach to deal with possible 
violations of constraints. A penalty function proposed by Coit et. al. [11] 
was employed in the algorithm: 
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Here, Fall is the best unpenalised value of the objective function yet found, 
Ffeas is the best feasible value of the objective function yet found, NFTi 
denotes the near-feasibility threshold that corresponds to a given 
constraint i, di(x,B) is the magnitude of the violation of a given constraint i 
for solution x, κi denotes a user-specified severity parameter and nc is the 
total number of constraints set for the problem. 
 
3.3.4 Replacement and Scaling 
 
Replacement was implemented employing an algorithm described by 
Chambers [12]. The idea of this algorithm is to replace a parent population 
with an offspring population. If the best parent chromosome is fitter than 
the best offspring chromosome than it replaces the worst offspring 
chromosome. Replacement is then followed by fitness scaling procedure. 
 
A linear fitness scaling [5] was introduced in order to improve the 
performance of the algorithm. Research shows that it is especially 
valuable when small population GA are employed. Parameters used in the 
linear scaling procedure are problem-independent. They depend on a 
population life and are found for a population in each generation. 
 
4. Application Example and Results 
 
The GSDOA has been applied to a simple High Integrity Protection 
System (HIPS) on an offshore oil production well. The main function of the 
HIPS is to prevent a high-pressure surge passing through it. Protection is 
provided for processing equipment whose pressure rating could be 
exceeded. Figure 2 represents the main features of the HIPS. 
 
PT PT
Master Wing ESDV HIPS
Sub-system 1 Sub-system 2
Production
Well
Processing
Platform
Equipment
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Structure of High Integrity Protection System 
 
HIPS is divided into two separate subsystems. Sub-system 1 is the 
Emergency Shutdown (ESD) sub-system. This is the first level of 
protection of the HIPS. Sub-system 2 provides an additional level of 
protection. Inclusion of the high-integrity protection system incorporates 
this second level of redundancy.  
 
The data for the optimisation problem of the HIPS included a fault tree for 
its initial design and data for each component such as failure rate, mean 
repair time, cost and testing time to perform maintenance. Time intervals 
between maintenance for two sub-systems were not defined thus they 
were included in the list of design variables. Ten main design variables 
were introduced (Table 1). Two limiting factors were considered. HIPS 
cost could not exceed 1000 units and maintenance down-time had to be 
less than 130 hours a year. 
 
The initial HIPS fault tree was altered twice using Pattern 3 (n=2, k=1, t=2) 
regarding system changes associated with replacement of one ESD and 
one HIPS valves. Pattern 2 (n=4, k=4, t=2) was also applied twice due to 
introduced replacement choices for pressure transmitters in both sub-
systems. 
 
GAs are guided search methods and the best values for the GA 
parameters are case dependant. Therefore the choice of GA parameter 
values was based a trial-and-error approach. Different values of 
population size, crossover rate and mutation rate were chosen. Three 
population sizes were analysed: 50, 30 and 10 chromosomes. Population 
size had the biggest influence on optimisation duration. Mutation rates 
were chosen equal to 0.001, 0.005 and 0.01 and crossover rate values 
were equal to 0.75, 0.8 and 0.95. The best result, i.e. the smallest number 
of generations required to find the minimal failure probability value was 
equal to 73 and was obtained when using a 50 chromosome population, a 
crossover rate equal to 0.75 and a probability of mutation equal to 0.01. 
In 1999 R. Partison [9] also implemented the simple GA specially 
designed for the HIPS optimization. The comparison of the best designs 
obtained using both approaches is in Table 2. 
 
Associated 
System 
Component 
Design 
Variable Design Variable Description 
Design 
Variable 
Value 
ESD Valve 
E Number of ESD valves fitted 1, 2 
V1 Valve type 
Type 1 or 
type 2 
HIPS Valve 
H Number of HIPS valves fitted 1,2 
V2 Valve type 
Type 1 or 
type 2 
Pressure 
Transmitter 1 
N1 
Number of pressure transmitters 
fitted in subsystem 1 1 - 4 
K1 
Number of pressure transmitters 
required to activate for subsystem 1 1 - N1 
P1 Pressure transmitter type 
Type 1 or 
type 2 
Pressure 
Transmitter 2 
N2 
Number of pressure transmitters 
fitted in subsystem 2 1 - 4 
K2 
Number of pressure transmitters 
required to activate for subsystem 2 1 – N2 
P2 Pressure transmitter type  
n/a 1θ  Inspection interval for subsystem 1 1 week – 2 years 
n/a 2θ  Inspection interval for subsystem 2 1 week – 2 years 
 
Table 1. Design Variables  
 
Associated 
System 
Component 
Design 
Variable 
Initial 
Design 
Design 
Variable 
Values of 
GA [xx] 
Design 
Variable 
Values of 
GSDOA 
ESD Valve E 1 0 2 V1 Type 1 n/a Type 1 
HIPS Valve H 1 2 1 V2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 2 
Pressure 
Transmitter 1 
N1 1 2 3 
K1 1 1 2 
P1 Type 1 Type 1 Type 1 
Pressure 
Transmitter 2 
N2 1 3 2 
K2 1 2 1 
P2 Type 1 Type 1 Type 2 
n/a 1θ  n/a 29 46 
n/a 2θ  n/a 32 29 
 
Table 2. Results Comparison 
 
Cost of the system with the design generated using the GA in [9] was 822 
units, maintenance down time was 128,43 hours and system unavailability 
was 7.6×10-4. System characteristics for the design obtained using 
GSDOA are as following; system cost 642 units, maintenance down time 
83.96 hours and system unavailability is 2.98×10-7. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The introduced algorithm is employed to solve a general system design 
optimisation problem. The objective of the optimisation process is to 
define a particular set of system components that would constitute an 
optimal system design. As a result the algorithm determines the case 
where the system failure probability is minimised and the utility of available 
resources is optimised. 
 
A simple High Integrity Protection System (HIPS) was employed as an 
application example. Comparison of the optimisation results obtained 
when using GSDOA and a simple GA specifically developed for HIPS 
optimisation shows that GSDOA is capable to provide good optimisation 
results. Using GSDOA system design was found with unavailability equal 
to 2.98×10-7 and cost 642 units. These characteristics are better that the 
ones of the system design obtained using the simple GA. 
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